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Abstract- The evolving nature of the internet will require 
continual advances in authentication and confidentiality 
protocols. Nature provides some clues as to how this can be 
accomplished in a distributed manner through molecular 
biology. Cryptography and molecular biology share certain 
aspects and operations that allow for a set of unified principles 
to be applied to problems in either venue. A concept for 
developing security protocols that can be instantiated at the 
genomics level is presented. A DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) 
inspired hash code system is presented that utilizes concepts 
from molecular biology. It is a keyed-Hash Message 
Authentication Code (HMAC) capable of being used in secure 
mobile Ad hoc networks. It is targeted for applications without 
an available public key infrastructure. Mechanics of creating 
the HMAC are presented as well as a prototype HMAC 
protocol architecture. Security concepts related to the 
implementation differences between electronic domain security 
and genomics domain security are discussed. 
Keywords- HMAC,· keyed HaJh Message Authentication 
Code; Cryptography; DNA; PKI; public key infrastructure; 
MANET; dpherprotein; epigenetics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ability to authenticate the identity of participants in a 
network is critical to network security. Bimolecular systems 
of gene expression "authenticate" themselves through 
various means such as transcription factors and promoter 
sequences. They have means of retaining "confidentiality" of 
the meaning of genome sequences through processes such as 
control of protein expression. These actions occur 
independently of a centralized control mechanism. The 
overall goal of the research is to develop practical systems of 
authentication and confidentiality such that independence of 
authentication and confidentiality can occur without a 
centralized third party system. 
Genes are capable of expressing a wide range of products 
such as proteins based upon an alphabet of only four 
symbols. This research implements a keyed-HMAC system 
using a DNA-based code and certain principles from 
molecular biology. The system will permit Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks (MANET) to distinguish trusted peers, yet tolerate 
the ingress and egress of nodes on an unscheduled, 
unpredictable basis. The system allows for authentication 
without a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), X.509 certificates, 
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RSA and nonce exchanges, etc. It also provides for a 
biological authentication capability. 
This paper is organized as follows:. 
• A description of the elements of the prototype 
genomic HMAC architecture 
• A description of the DNA code encryption process, 
genome selection and properties 
• The elements of the prototype protocol architecture 
and its concept of operations 
• A short plaintext to ciphertext encryption example. 
• Description of the principles of gene expression 
and transcriptional control to develop protocols for 
information security. These protocols would 
operate in both the electronic and genomic 
domains. ' 
This paper will move between the electronic and 
genomics contexts when discussing the protocols and their 
potential instantiation. This scheme can be used to create 
encrypted forms of gene expression that express a unique, 
confidential pattern of gene expression and protein 
synthesis. The ciphertext code carries the promoters ( and 
reporters and regulators) necessary to control the expression 
of genes in the encrypted chromosomes to produce 
cipherproteins. Unique encrypted cellular structures can be 
created that can be tied to the electronic hash code to create 
biological authentication and confidentiality schemes. 
I. ELEMENTS OF THE GENOMICS HMAC 
ARCHITECTURE 
Plaintext is mapped into a reduced representation 
consisting of an alphabet of q letters, where q = 4 for a 
genomic alphabet such as DNA or Ribonucleic acid (RNA), 
q = 20 for proteomic alphabet, or other values when 
representing other functions in molecular biology, e.g., 
histone code. The actual HMAC requires additional base 
representations beyond the four DNA bases, but the 
minimum requirement is shown in (I) and (2). B is the set 
of DNA bases A, T, C and G, which represent the molecules 
adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine and represent the 
entire alphabet of the genomic hash code. DNA bases have 
the property that the only permitted pairs are Watson-Crick 
matches (A-T), (C-G), thus, the binary representations of B 
and B' sets are complimentary such that a r-bit length 
sequence of Bq and B 'q maintain the identity property show_n 
in (3). Assignment of letter to DNA base sequences 1s 
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perf onned. Letters with greater frequency can be assigned 
shorter DNA sequences to reduce the code size. 
A. lexicographic and DNA representation of plaintext 
Plaintext words, P are converted into a numerical form 
suitable for subsequent coding into the cryptographic 
alphabet of the required code. Plaintext words are coded 
such that a lexicographic order is maintained between 
words, i.e., the numerical fonns may take either integer or 
floating point representations. F is a function that converts 
the plaintext to lexicographic numerical form. D represents 
the numerical form of the dictionary (lexicographically 
ordered set) such that D1, •. n represents the set of all words. 
The subset of Di, .. i represents the subset of words in the 
plaintext message. The function U assigns the DNA base 
sequence corresponding to the Di as shown in (4), (5) and 
(6). L is the plaintext message coded into the DNA alphabet 
found in sets B and B'. 
B. Sentence-message order coding 
A system of linear equations codes the lexicographic 
position of each word relative to the sentence position of 
each word. This complicates detection of words based upon 
frequency analysis. Multiple appearances of the same word 
are uniquely coded. As a minimum requirement, if there are 
i DNA representations in the message, and n represents a 
numerical sequence related to the number of DNA 
representations in the message (the simplest case being i = 
I, 2, 3, ... , n), then the system of linear equations shown in 
(7) provide the solutions for sentence-message order 
coding. 
Bq= {A, T, C, G} 
B'q = {T, A, G, C} 
l= B'q EB B''q Vr=l, ... ,q. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Equations I and 2 define the sets containing the DNA 
bases that comprise the alphabet for the HMAC code. 
Equation 3 defines the complimentary relationship required 
for the binary representations of the members of that space. 
For example: the XOR product of the 1"'11 bit of A and T is a 
one as is true for T and A, C and G, G and C. 
D1 = F(Pi) 3 D1 < D,+l Vi< n 
L = U(D1, Bq) 11 U(D2, Bq) II ... II U(D.,Bq) 
L' = U(Di. B'q) II U(Di, B'q) U •.• 11 U(D.,B'q) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Equation 4 defines each word in the message, Pi as a 
member of a set of all words in a lexicographically ordered 
dictionary. Equations 5 and 6 show the operation of the 
function that assigns a DNA sequence using the members of 
the set of DNA bases to a coding of concatenated sequences 
labeled L and L'. L and L' maintain the same complimentary 
relationship that is a property of the individual DNA bases in 
the sets Bq and B 'q· 
This yields a series of coefficients Xi, x2, ••• , Xi that are 
concatenated as shown in (8). The binary representation of 
each coefficient undergoes bit expansions such that only Bq 
or B 'q codes are represented in the bit stream created by (8). 
X represents the relationship between lexicographic coding 
of the words and their position in the message. 
C. Message coding 
DNA coding on the message is completed by XOR and 
bit expansions to maintain the DNA base coding in the 
binary sequence in the operation shown in (9). M is the 
plaintext message coded into the DNA alphabet and coded 
again with the sentence-message coefficients. This sequence 
will be subjected to encryption. 
(7) 
(8) 
M=LEBX (9) 
The set of linear equations in equation 7 provide the 
process of sentence-message order coding using the rth 
position in the message to code each word of the message. 
The resulting coefficients are concatenated and XOR'd with 
the coded plaintext message to produce the ciphertext 
message. 
II. ENCRYPTION PROCESS 
The use of DNA as a cryptographic medium is not new. 
Systems using DNA as a one-time code pad [I], image 
compression-(lncryption system [2], encryption utilizing 
dummy sequences of DNA [3]-[4] and DNA watermarks [5] 
have been published. The approach described herein is a new 
implementation of DNA-based cryptography targeted at 
network security. 
A. Chromosome encryption keys 
Approximately 800 genomes have been sequenced [6]. 
The human genome alone has approximately 3.2 million 
base pairs. The sets of genomes provides for the possibility 
of "security by obscurity". Additionally, there is an infinite 
number of ways to use genome sequences as cryptographic 
keys. However, genomes have high degrees of redundancy 
and sequence conservation across species. Consequently, 
sections of genomes used as keys should be treated as one-
time pads. The frrst step.is to select a genome and a sequence 
from that genome and encode it with the binary 
representations of Bq and B 'q• 
DNA consists of two complimentary sequences, referred 
to as the sense and antisense strands as shown in Figure I 
[7]. A DNA sequence has a start point called the five-prime 
end (5') and an endpoint called the three-prime (3'). In 
biochemistry, the 5' and 3' designations refer to orientation 
of each strand necessary for proper replication and 
transcription. The complements are bonded to each other 
base by base to create base pairs. The antisense strand is 
oriented in the 3' to the 5' direction, relative to the sense 
strand. For a DNA encryption key, both sense and antisense 
strands can be encoded and utilized. Figures 2 and 3 
demonstrate two ways of implementing the chromosome 
encryption key in the HMAC scheme. Figure 2 represents 
the simplest scheme in which successive bases from the key 
and message are XOR'd and a single ciphertext message is 
produced. Encryption proceeds in the 5' to 3' direction using 
the sense strand. Figure 3 represents a more complex scheme 
in which both sense and antisense bases from key and 
message are XOR'd. Encryption proceeds in the 5' to 3' 
direction in both strands. 
B. Mismatches and Annealing 
The encryption process generates base pair mismatches 
that do not conform to the A-T, C-G pairing rule. These 
mismatches are central to creating a one-way hash code. 
Subsequent to the encryption step, the mismatches are 
resolved through an annealing process that results in an 
irreversible transformation of the encryption sequence not 
directly traceable to the original ciphertext. 
III. PROTOTYPE DNA-BASED, KEYED HMAC SYSTEM 
Assume a network such as the one shown in Figure 4. 
Jack, Jill, JoAnn and Lisa wish to form a secure MANET. In 
the same wireless transceiver space can be found X and Y 
whose intentions are unknown, but are capable of sending 
and receiving messages. Jack, Jill, JoAnn and Lisa possess 
all of the required authentication tools: 
• A common genome, C, to use as an HMAC key. 
• A pre-shared secret, pss, unique to each party. 
• The DNA-based HMAC algorithm. 
Consider two authentication scenarios. In the first 
scenario Jack, Jill, JoAnn and Lisa send and receive cleartext 
messages using the DNA-based HMAC authentication. If the 
receiver is not the intended destination, the receiver 
rebroadcasts 
the message with their hash and the process continues until 
the message reaches the intended receiver or until a message 
time-out period elapses. X and Y also receive the cleartext 
messages and hash codes. X and Y may possess the 
algorithm. However, if X and Y wish to substitute a new 
message with a valid hash code, or forward the message and 
have it accepted by the network members, they have to 
create a valid hash code and checksum, which requires 
knowledge of the chromosome sequence and valid pre-
shared secrets known to the other MANET nodes. The 
MANET members change their pre-shared. secrets on a pre-
established basis to thwart a brute force attack to derive the 
pre-shared secret from the hash code. 
In the second scenario, Jack, Jill, JoAnn and Lisa wish to 
establish a trust relationship before exchanging sensitive 
information across a MANET. In this case, the participants 
utilize a confidentiality (encryption) protocol for the 
messages and establish a chain of custody using keyed 
HMAC authentication. A hash chain of hash codes is 
established such that each recipient can determine the origin 
and subsequent hops of the message. In this case, X and Y 
cannot read the plaintext and the hash code transcript may be 
encrypted and compressed with the ciphertext. 
A. Genomic hash code properties 
Table 1 summarizes the properties of the prototype hash 
code against the requirements for an ideal hash code [8]. 
Figure 5 provides a flow chart of the genomic hash coding 
process. 
B. Initialize and Perform Lexicographic and DNA 
assignments 
The plain text message is read and parsed into 3-word 
blocks (3WB). Take each word in the string, assign it a 
lexicographic value of x.yyyy .... y where x = 1, .... ,26 
corresponding to the first letter of the word and subsequent 
letters are assigned to each successive decimal place until 
the entire word is coded in a rational number. Assign a 
DNA letter code to each letter. Most common English alpha 
characters use 2-letter codes, the rest use a 3-letter code as 
shown in table 2. The column labeled 'a' is the English 
alphabetic character adjacent to its DNA code equivalent. 
As an example, the short phrase 'jump out windows' is 
shown in its lexicographic and DNA assigned forms in table 
3. 
TABLE I. GENOMIC HASH CODE PROPERTIES. 
Property Compliance 
Produces a fixed length output. 2560 bits 
Can be applied to a block of data of any Yes. len!?th 
H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any Yes. 12 step process 
message x. for hash code. 
One-way property. For any h, it is To be determined 
computationally infeasible to find H(x)=h 
Weak collision resistance. For a set of Xi 
messages, with yt.x1 for all i, no H(y)=H(xJ Yes. 
for all i. 
Strong collision resistance. For any x, with No. Messages $ 128 
v.t.x. no HM=H(x) bits require padding 
TABLE 2. SAMPLE OF ALPHA TO DNA CONVERSION CODES. 
a DNA a DNA a DNA a DNA 
0 CGG G TT N TO u CT 
A GC H AC 0 AG V CTG 
B TGT I AA p GA w CAC 
C TC J AAG 0 CCT X GTA 
D GT K ACT R cc y GTT 
E TA L AT s GG z TAG 
TABLE 3. PLAINTEXT TO LEXICOGRAPHIC ORDER AND DNA 
LETTER CODES. 
Plain Text Lexicographic DNA conversion 
conversion 
jumo 10.211316 AAGCTCGGA 
out IS.2120 AGCTCA 
windows 23.9144152319 CACAATGGTAGCACGG 
C. Binary representation of the DNA bases 
The four DNA bases (A, T, C, G) are represented by 
binary sequences (0011, 1100, 1001, 0110). The remaining 
12 four-bit sequences code for transitional base sequences 
that are used to anneal mismatches in the encryption process 
as shown in table 4. The 'Key' column represents the base 
in the chromosome encryption key. The 'M' column 
represents the corresponding base in the DNA coded 
message. 
TABLE 4. ENCRYPTION AND ANNEALING TABLE. 
Key M Result Anneal Key M Result Anneal 
A T T G C G G A 
A A r,A C C A aA C 
A C r.C T C C aC G 
A G e:G A C T aT T 
T A' A T G C C C 
T G cc G G A tA G 
T C cG A G G tG A 
T T cT C G T tT T 
The 'Result' column represents the results of encrypting the 
key onto message. The 'Anneal' column represents the final 
ciphertext base. In an operational system, all codes would be 
significantly lengthened to thwart brute force attacks. 
D. Encryption, Mismatches and Annealing 
Figure 5 also provides a short example of the encryption 
and annealing process. Each base in the chromosome is 
XOR'd against the corresponding base in the message .. Ifthe 
base in the message is the complement of the base m the 
chromosome, the base in the message is copied to the 
encrypted output string and then altered to a new base in the 
annealed output string If the base in the message is not the 
complement of the base in the chromosome, a transitional 
base whose value depends upon the mismatch is written to 
the ;ncrypted output string. The 5' base always determines 
the change in the other strand; consequently, a 5' G 
mismatch always codes for a 3' transitional base. This 
feature allows tracking of point mutations and provides a 
future expansion capability for mutations. The annealing 
process also alters the encrypted result by transforming the 
positions that are not mismatches. 
E. Cryptographic Genome 
Mycoplasma genitalium G37 (NCBI accession number 
NC000908.2) is the bacterial genome used as an encryption 
key in the prototype system. There are a number of 
characteristics of M genitalium that make it a good 
candidate as an encryption key base. It may be the smallest, 
self-replicating genome. It has 580,070 base pairs with 470 
predicted coding regions. M genitalium has a low G+C 
content of 34% (random distribution of basepair content 
would provide for 50% G-C pairs and 50% A-T pairs). This 
feature provides some testability advantages. The genome 
contains 470 predicted protein coding regions, which is also 
a manageable number of potential cipherproteins [9]. 
Knowledge of the genome coding characteristics is 
important in selecting and utilizing genomes as 
cryptographic keys. Approximately 62,000 base pairs are 
being utilized from the M genitalium genome for the 
prototype HMAC. 
F. Protocol for Message Authentication. 
The process is as follows: . 
• Encode the plaintext message into DNA code (Pre-
sense message) 3 words at a time (3 word blocks -
3WB) 
• Encrypt with pre-shared secret chromosome key and 
generate sense and antisense strands. 
• Different chromosome segments are used to encrypt 
each 3WB for increased key confidentiality. 
• Combine sense and antisense strands to create a 
checksum (S). 
• Anneal the sense strand (Sender) or the antisense 
strand (Receiver) removing the transitional bases in 
the 3WBs. 
• Concatenate the first 64 DNA bases from the first 
nine 3WBs to create the Promoter (P). 
• Append the checksum to the Promoter. The Promoter 
II checksum is the Hash Code, K (2560 bits long). 
The sender and receiver processes are summarized in 
Figure 6. 
The receiver extracts the Promoter and checksum from 
the message. The hash code computed at the receiver must 
have the complement of the Promoter sequence and an exact 
match of the checksum. Sender and receiver must have the 
pre-shared secret of the genome, and the location of the first 
base of the sequence. A sample of the output for the test 
message 'jump out windows' is shown in Figure 7. 1:he 
hash code has been truncated for test and presentat10n 
purposes. 
G. Short Message Performance 
A critical factor in determining the goodness of a hash 
code is the ability to satisfy criteria four and five from table 
1. A hash code algorithm should not produce identical hash 
code outputs for two or more different messages. 
Performance of short messages was evaluated ·ror soft and 
hard collision resistance. The number of MAC 
verifications, R, required to perform a forgery attack on a 
m-bit MAC by brute-force verifications [IO] is shown in 
equation I 0: 
m-1 m-1 m m-1 R=2 +(2 -1)/2 "'2 (10) 
5. 
3• 
5. 
Adenine (A) 5' template S 
s strand . \ Cytre (C) /:·nm11BI:. 
· Sense 5'·y;'-,t~. ·M',...,.:;,~w..,~~~-rl' 
Antisense 3' ,, 5• 
3' new S' 
5' news 
parent DNA ouble he!ix\ 
3
.~~ 
S' strand f , \5' 1 ,. 
· Guanine (G) ~3 ...... ' template S'. 
Thymine (D 
Figure L Strand Sequence specificationin DNA. A binds with T, C binds with G. 
3' 
5' 
Chromosome Key Sense Strand Chromosome Key Sense Strand 
T T AT A AG T A A 3• 5 . T T AT A AG T A A 3• 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
T T C A TT 5. 3. T T C A TT 5 • 
h omosome Key Antisense Strand 
Message Sense Strand 
G G G G G G C C G C 3• 5• . 
I I I I I I I I I I 
3' CCC CCC G G CG 5' 3' CCC CCC G 
Message Antisense Strand Message Antisense Strand 
One ciphertext message sequence Two ciphertext message sequences 
Figure 2. Single sttandchromosomeencryptionutilizing Figure 3. Dualsttandchromosomeenayptionyielding 
yielding a single ciphertext message sequence. two cipherte.'Xt message sequences 
-----@--..... _ Lisa: (H(M,C),pssu,a) 
---
Jack Lisa 
Jack: (H(M,C),pss1;c1'1- .. 
· .... Jyl~-- JoAnn 
-- Trusted Routes · ~~ JoAnn: (H(M,C),pssJoAnnl 
- - - - -> Routes with untrusted nodes 
H(M.C),pssnod• = HMAC Algorithm, over Message M, 
hashed with Chromosome key, C, at starting location 
defined by a unique, pre•shared secret (pss) 
X, Y - do. not posses c or pss, possess HMACAlgorlthm 
Figure 4. Mobile Ad-hocNetwcd:: 't\lth trusted anduntnatednodesandroutes. 
Sentence message 
order coding 
Initial ONA Coding 
,---........ --.... 
L=(D1,B.,) 11, ... ,J IU(O,,Bq) X=x.1' I,~.,! Ix. 
Expansion 1 DNA coding Expansion 2 
@ 
Expansions equalize bit 
lengths M E1Cpahsion 3 
and recover base coding ~~-e 
form Coded message sense strand 
51 Key AAGTTA 
M CCAAGG 
·t Encrypt 
gCgCtAAcCgG 
t Anneal 
TTGTGA 
Cannot be reversed 
Egure 5. Plaintextcoding process, Enayption andAnnealingprocess 
Sender 
Genome 
data...---~ 
Encrypt 
Egure 6. Sender andRecen·er Protocol. 
DNASense strand coded me55age 
AAGCTCGGAAGCTCACACAATGGTAGCACGG 
M genitalium key 
llTAGlTATAAGTTATTATTTAGTTAATAAGTTATT 
ATTm•mN GTTATTATTTAGT 
checksum= 1871221 
----Sender copy of hasn-----
SenderHash = 
AAAAAAGTATTCTTTGTCAGTGTTTGTGCGTTTCAACCCCTC 
AATTAGATITATAGAGTCCTTC 
----Receiver copy of hash-----
Sender Hash "' 
AAAAAAGTATTCTTTGTCAGTGTTTGTGCGTTTCAACCCCTC 
AATTAGATITATAGAGTCCTTC 
Receiver Hash = 
TTTTTTCATAAGAAACAGTCACAAACACGCAAAGTTGGGGA 
GTTAATCTAAATATCTCAGGAAG 
SenderChecksum • 1871221 
Receiver Checksum• 1871221 
Plain Text • jump out windows / 
Checksum matched 
hash code matched Plain Text = • 1 
• t • d / User and Message Authenticated. Jump OU \Vtn O\VS 
M 8 'Id 4 f DNA H h C d Syst d d at Me mtge Reader 4 for DNA Hash Code System ended at: essage u1 er • or as o e em en e : 512112009 1,3 .09 PM 5/21/20091:24:47 PM · 2• 
Figure 7. Sample output of sender and receiver performing authentication on the cleartextphrase 'jwnp out 
"indows'. 
The variable R is an upper bound to the brute-force 
verification limit. Short messages were repeatedly hashed 
using over different cryptographic sequences to look for 
collisions. The process is shown in figure 8. Table 5 
summarizes the results of those tests. 
The single letter message exhibited 403 checksum 
collisions and 466 hash code collisions. Chromosomes have 
a high degree of redundancy and repetition; therefore short 
messages will require padding to eliminate hash code 
collisions. These statistics utilize different transcripts on the 
same message to identify potential collisions. These 
statistics should be indicative of the potential for multiple 
messages to produce the same hash code from a single 
transcript. For secure authentication purposes, this code 
must be implemented with higher level protocols that would 
block a brute force attack and not reuse genome sequences 
for authentication. It must also move the starting point in 
the genome to widely separated start positions to prevent an 
attacker from guessing the encryption sequence. 
Short plaintext messages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 
------,------- 63, 164, 738 characters 
Encrypt with M. genital/um 
Genome starting at position n 
! 
Increment n by 1 base 1---------' 
Sort hash codes 
and check for collisions 
1000 times 
Figure 8. Collision resistance tests for short messages 
TABLE 5. SAMPLE OF HASH CODE COLLISIONS 
windows lump outwlmlowo 
um out '9 
la,ge pleMe require all 
ptr10nnel to take th•k' 
tquip,Mnt with Chem for the 
won. to be potfortnod In 
365m 1mall lnc,-menta k 
will be good., gel pro,:tlce 
onlh.,.101b 202 
e s.-76 
SIJ 1.241:•173 
A hash code must be secure against the possibility that 
the cryptographic key, in this case the original genome 
sequence cannot be recovered from the hash code. Figure 9 
represents a small MANET example for developing trust 
metrics. Assume Jack is broadcasting forward requests to 
establish a link with Lisa and Lisa is broadcasting return 
route requests to Jack to establish a return link. Jill is 
relaying route requests in both directions. Felix wishes to 
join the MANET. Each node is capable of dynamically 
appearing and disappearing from the network at will via 
application of a dynamic source routing protocol. Each node 
can also take the role untrusted/unknown trust or trusted 
depending upon the situation. Source and Destination must 
detennine the trustability of a potential route through some 
quantitative means. In this case successful forward and 
return route requests (FREQ, RREQ) and route delays are 
. used to create the trust metrics. The sources and destination 
can set the minimum level of trust for a route via a dynamic 
fitness algorithm. 
mo. 
~IFe11xj l~REO_AC ' REQ REO ACK REQ ' ' Jack - •e ••o~ I Lisa j REOACK ~ I( .. ~PEQAC1< 1-:i~Ai;n 1 -
~Q , •• 
. Not a trusted member, but keeps 
r Jo~ nl lnactille ll1I route requests attempting to acct 
MANET ! Felix I New Member 
Figure 9. MANET route establishment at a slice in time. 
To establish Felix as a trusted member, he relays forward 
REQs from Jack destined for Lisa and return REQ from 
Lisa destined for Jack with his DNA HMAC' authentication 
attached. JoAnn, does not respond to route requests and 
those requests time-out. Y is a malfeasor attempting to 
breach the network by sending route requests with 
counterfeit DNA HMAC authentication and analyzing 
received DNA HMACs for vulnerabilities. Assume that 
when Y sends a counterfeit route request, genuine nodes 
respond with negative acknowledgement attached to a 
genuine authentication code. 
The questions to be answered are: 
Can Y establish a counterfeit authentication code (hash + 
checksum) for the current session (however a session is 
defined)? 
Can Y utilize the stolen information to recover infonnation 
that might be useful for a future network breach? 
If Y can recover the original cryptographic sequence, or 
detennine the genome and genome location a cryptographic 
key was taken from, Y may be able.to forge a valid hash 
code. This could be problematic for a cryptographic 
sequence due to the high degree of redundancy in the all 
genomes. For this application, the hash code must be 
evaluated against the cryptographic key to ensure it has the 
proper characteristics of diffusion and confusion. 
IV. MUTATION EFFECTS, FITNESS, DIFFUSION 
AND CONFUSION 
Life is intolerant of a high mutation rate in its genetic 
code. Ribonucleic acid (RNA) viruses have the highest 
mutation rate of any living species, 10·3 to 10·5 
errors/nucleotide and replication cycle [11]. The human 
DNA mutation rate has been approximated to be on the 
order of 10·8 errors/nucleotide and generation [12]. Injection 
of mutations into DNA encrypted messages is an approach 
to improving the encryption process. Because of the 
dynamic, evolutionary nature of this approach, potential 
intruders must continually intercept decoding instructions 
between source and destination. Missing one generation of 
genome decryption information seriously corrupts the 
analysis process. Missing multiple generations eventually 
renders previous decryption analyses useless. 
In evolutionary biology, fitness is a characteristic that 
relates to the number of offspring produced from a given 
genome. From a population genetics point of a view the 
relative fitness of the mutant depends upon the number of 
descendants per wild-type descendant[13J. In evolutionary 
computing, a fitness algorithm determines whether 
candidate solutions, in this case encrypted messages, are 
sufficiently encrypted to be transmitted. This DNA 
encryption method uses evolutionary computing principles 
of fitness algorithms to determine which encrypted mutants 
should be selected as the final encrypted ciphertext. Two 
parameters, Confusion and Diffusion are being used as the 
basis of the fitness criteria. Diffusion and Confusion are 
fundamental characteristics of ciphers. Shannon [14] 
describes them as: 
a) Diffusion: any redundancy or patterns in the 
plaintext message are dissipated into the long range 
statistics of the ciphertext message. 
b) Confusion: make complex the relationship between 
the plaintext and ciphertext. A simple substitution cipher 
would provide very little confusion to a code breaker. 
· The challenge is to create a set of FREQ and RREQ 
messages that hash into codes with a high degree of 
diffusion and confusion. One strategy for attacking the 
authentication message is to generate long strings of zeros 
and identify the correct code for the non-zero positions. If a 
message generates long strings of zeros it is particularly 
vulnerable to a key recovery attack because the attacker can 
reduce the number of bit matches required by the length of 
zero bit blocks. Table 7 summarizes test results of 1000 
trials on messages consisting of zeroes and spaces against 
the genome. No collisions were identified. The hash code 
will be tested against all other single character strings to 
identify patterns. A sample hash code of a string of 217 
zeros is shown below in table 6. 
TABLE 6. SAMPLE HASH CODE OF STRING OF 217 ZEROS 
AATTCTAAGTTCCCGCCCGTCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCGGTC 
CGCCGCCCGTCCCGGTCCGCCGCAATCTCAATTCTCGCCCG 
TCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCCGGTCCG 
CCGCCAACTCCAATCTTGCCCGTCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCG 
GTCCGCCGCCCGTCCCGGTCCGCCGCCCAATCCGAACTTCC 
CCGTCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCCGGT 
CCGCCGCCCGAACCGTAATTCTCCGTCGGTCCGCCGCCCGT 
CCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTAACGTTAA 
TCTTCGTCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCGGTCCGCCGCCCGTCCC 
GGTCCGCCGCCCGTCAAGTTCAACTTTAATCCGAACTTCAA 
TCGTAACGTTAA TCTTTCGTTTAAGTTCAACTTT AA TTAATT 
CTAATTTCAACCGTAATTCTAACGTTAAGTTCAACTTTCGTT 
TCAATTCTAATTTCAATC 10437404 
Next the hash codes were compared to the original 
cryptographic keys to evaluate diffusion and confusion. 
Table 8 displays four mutation samples from 50 
combinations of hash codes on the message 'jump out 
windows' with encryption keys from the genome. The 
process was run on I 000 message combinations at a time. 
TABLE 7. TEST RESULTS ON REDUNDANT STRINGS OF ZEROES 
MESSAGES 
Plain Text Hash length Number of 
collisions 
00000000 00000000 00000000 73 0 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 109 0 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 217 0 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 00000000 00000000 
Mutant 4, for example would be a particularly poor fit due 
to the number of consecutive matches between the hash 
code and encryption key. Mutant IO has only one match of 
two consecutive bases and a fewer than Y.i of the bases are 
identical between the hash code and key. Each position in 
the hash code has I of 4 chance of randomly matching the 
same location in the encryption key. 
TABLE 8. SAMPLE MUTANT ENCRYPTIONS FOR HASH CODES 
AND DNA ENCRYPTION KEY FOR MESSAGE 'JUMP OUT 
WINDOWS' 
ID 64 base pair hash Cryptographic key 
code 
Mutant 4 AAAAAATGATGG TAAGTTATTATTTAG 
TCCGCCAGTGCTC TAAGTTATTATTTAG 
CGGCTCTCCAAT TTAAGTTATTATTTA 
GCCTGAATCAGA GTTTAAGTTATT ATTT 
TGGAGAGATTCT AGT 
GGC 
Mutant 10 AAAAAACGATGG TTATAAOTTATTATTT 
CTGGCGATCTCTC AGTAAGTTATTATTT 
CGTTCCCGTAACT AGTTAAGTTATTATT 
CCTGAAGGATAG TAGTTTAAGTTATTA 
CTATAGATTCCCT TTT 
. C 
Mutant 23 AAAAAAGGAGGG AAGTTATTATTTAGT 
CGGGCCAGTGCT TAAGTTATTATTTAG 
CCGGCTCTTCAAT TTTAAGTTATTATTTA 
CGCGTAAGTAGA GTTATAAGTTATTAT 
TCCACAGAGTGT TTA. 
CTG 
Mutant 2S AAAAAAGGAGGT GTTAAGTTATTATTT 
TTGTGTAGCGTTT AGTTTAAGTTATTAT 
GGGCCCTCGAAC TTAGTTATAAGTTAT 
CGGCGAAGGAGA TATTTAGTTAATAAG 
GGGAGATATCTT TTAT 
CCC 
The confusion metric counts the number of 2-base, 3-base, 
4-base and 5-base consecutive matches between the hash 
code and the key. Each combination actually represents a 
mutant message which can be further evaluated via a genetic 
algorithm. One of the major advantages of this system of a 
conventional encryption system is the ability to provide a 
set of encrypted outputs from which the most fit {best) 
member can be selected. 
TABLE 9. SAMPLE DIFFUSION AND CONFUSION SCORES FOR 
HASH CODE FOR MESSAGE 'JUMP OUT WINDOWS' 
Diffusion -
matching base Confusion - consecutive 
ID pair positions match l)Ositions 
2 3 4 5 
Mutant 10 11 l 0 0 0 
Mutant 23 II I 0 0 0 
Mutant 25 21 5 l 0 0 
Mutant 4 25 9 5 3 2 
A. Intronic sequence padding and potential frameshift 
mutations can increase cryptographic hardness 
Padding short messages and short words has been 
previously discussed as a means to decrease collisions and 
reduce the likelihood of successfully forging messages. 
Adding padding to the front of messages as well as the end 
and padding short words makes it more difficult for an 
attacker to find the start of the coded message sequence. The 
analogy in molecular biology is the frameshift mutation in 
which changing the starting position for a single nucleotide 
can result in a completely different protein sequence as 
shown in figure 10. The mechanics of DNA transcription in 
cells relies on a number of properties to identify the 
nucleotide triplet sequence that actually transcribes to 
mRNA which translates to a protein. Some of the mechanics 
are thermodynamic and biochemical in nature such as DNA 
folding, binding to transcription factors, and chromatin 
relaxation in eukaryotes. Some of the mechanics are 
sequence related. Four types of sequences and mechanisms 
from molecular biology are directly relevant to this 
discussion: 
a. Start codon {e.g. ATG) to specify the transcription start 
site {three letter sequence that ultimately specifies the 
first amino acid in the protein to be translated.) 
b. Stop codon ([AA, TGA, TAG) to end transcription 
c. Promoters. The function of promoters is different in 
prokaryotes and eukaryotes, but as a general statement, 
the promoter is sequence of nucleotides necessary to 
locate the transcription starting point. In eukaryotic 
genes that contain a promoter, the sequence often 
contains the letters 'TATA' hence the term 'TATA 
box'. 
d Enhancers. In eukaryotes, a variety of sequences 
upstream and downstream from the transcription site 
provide binding sites for transcription factors (proteins) 
necessary to enhance protein expression. 
The transcription {decryption) of DNA uses these 
sequences as markers for process control. But the sequences 
can have multiple interpretations. A TG within a gene codes 
for the amino acid methionine; at the start of a gene it is a 
start codon. All instances of TAT A do not signify a 
promoter. These ambiguities provide DNA with its own 
version of adding diffusion and confusion, and the analyst 
must fully understand the rules and mechanisms of 
transcription. In fact, research in gene expression starts with 
unambiguously identifying the actual gene sequence that 
codes for proteins (in eukaryotes this is called the exon 
region) from intervening sequences that are untranslated 
regions that do not code for proteins (intron regions) as 
shown in figure 11 for the human gene hspB9, which codes 
for heat shock protein B9 {Ensembl ENSGOOOOOI97723). 
Referring back to figure 10, transcription from a different 
start site would yield a different outcome, one that is 
possibly fatal to the organism. Padding creates introns 
spread throughout the message ( exon). 
DNA Code 
G G T C A A C G T G A A C C T 
I I I I I 11 I I I 
EJ EJ G IGLU 'I I PRO 1 
Correct Amino Acid Translation 
Frameshlft mutation of ONA Code 
G G T C A A C G T G A A C C T 
I II I l._ _ ___.l I I 
I VAL < I I ASN I I VAL I ~ 
Resulting Error Amino Acid Translation 
Figure 10. Frameshift Mutations 
Start codon 
5' untranslated region j Nat a stop codon 
c:;::G~CCT!I3ACAG:AGtl'AGtTG<:TGActC~.;:;ATQO..~AGAG'!'C';;~~cncl'C 
CAACGAGt..GCC~tGGCJU:CCGGl'tlTCCCAGCGtGG~CTTGCT~AA:G~AACCGGGt 
GOCCAC~~CGG!GC~GCIGCTCA.GG:lACAG!CCAG:GGCTCAGGAGSACllIGACCA 
TGCCJ..,GAGA ""GTT!CCAAATGAAGctG;:;AT~~CGGCl''I'C4C::::cGGMGAACTGGt 
G3!G""J..G:Z? '!GGCCA,~1"~CTGA!G-~TGACCOGACAGCAGCAA:tG!:iAC3TCAGGGA 
C~CG$AAAGG1J,1. Gtl' GC.A";Gi'QC1.GAA:JGTGCACCGGA.AAA.7GC'IC:ccn:c~ 
C:TG~t::CIAC CCi\T, ACCTG....'70CCTGACCCCCTCCGGGCAG:TGTG:;;:'.il"CAGAGG 
CCAGTGTGTGGCGC GGC, CTCCCTGAA~CCCAAACAGGACCGI'CCCCGAGACTCGSGAG 
c:TCGi'.iCICTAAZGC •c, AACCIGACCCG,';:'AAACAM:SACGCGAIG!'GCAG':A;j 
~ t--~~~ 
3' untranslated region Not a nop codon Nat a start codon Stop codon 
Figure 11. Confusion factors in actual DNA genome 
The same confusion and diffusion factors would apply when 
crafting DNA coded messages for the electronic domain that 
will be later instantiated into actual genomes. The 
ciphertext must be capable of meeting the requirements of 
the cryptographic hardness in the electronic domain while 
producing a ciphertext that can be reliably integrated into a 
cellular genome via standard techniques, transcripted into 
RNA, and translated into the appropriate cipherprotein. 
Decryption (expression) of the cipherprotein gene occurs in 
response to specific decryption instructions hidden within 
the electronic domain ciphertext. 
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRYPTOGRAPHY 
AND GENE EXPRESSION 
The following relationships can be observed between the 
cryptographic treatment of messages and control of gene 
expression. In the case of gene expression, the message is 
genomic (DNA or RNA sequence). 
• Cryptography transforms messages between two 
states: plain and encrypted. 
• Cryptography uses operations such as circular shifts, 
bit expansions, bit padding, arithmetic operations to 
create ciphertext. These operations have analogs in 
molecular biology, e.g. transposable elements 
• Cells transform DNA sequences in genes between 
two states: Expressed (decrypted) and Silent 
( encrypted) 
• In prokaryotes a simple system involving operators 
and repressors can be described in terms of 
encryption and decryption, but prokaryotes have 
fewer mechanisms available for a rich set of 
cryptographic protocols. Figure 12 provides an 
example from Escherichia coli using /acZ gene 
expression. 
In this prokaryotic example from E. coli, the /acZ gene 
expresses the P-galactosidase enzyme when lactose is 
present and the simple sugar glucose is absent. P-
galactosidase metabolizes lactose into glucose and 
galactose. It would be inefficient to express the enzyme 
above a trace level if glucose is present. Figure 12 provides 
a cryptographic analogy to the states of the lacZ gene under 
the various conditions of glucose and lactose present, 
lactose present, and lactose absent. The lacZ gene is 
encrypted when lactose is absent or both lactose and glucose 
are present. A repressor protein (rep) authenticates (binds) 
to the encryption site (lacZ operator) on the lacZ gene with 
lactose is absent. A catabolite activator protein (CAP) 
authenticates (binds) to the decryption site (CAP site) 
allowing RNA polymerase to decrypt (express) the lacZ 
gene when glucose is absent. All of these operations are 
·shown as analogies to elements of cryptographic message 
traffic in operations shown in figure 12. It is possible to 
write the description of the gene expression sequence in 
figure 12 in terms of a series of messages between a sender 
and receiver. 
Figure 13 shows the architecture of the DNA HMAC 
(without all the required control regions) described in detail 
in this paper and its comparison between gene 
transcriptional control structures for a typical mammalian 
gene, and a simple, yet important eukaryote, yeast (S. 
Cerevisiae). The DNA HMAC structure preserves the intent 
of the design to mimic a genomic transcriptional control 
structure. 
A successful, in vivo instantiation of a DNA HMAC 
system will require specific stop codons, start codons, 
promoters and enhancers sequences. An in vivo DNA 
encryption system should be multi-dimensional, utilize 
primary, secondary and tertiary structural information and 
include up/downstream regulators such that a single 
sequence can be seamlessly implemented at the genomic 
level and have multiple levels of encryption at the message 
or data level, depending upon the context (only known 
between sender and receiver). This approach also permits 
generation of mutant hash codes which can be evaluated for 
fitness such that only the best hash code is selected for 
authentication purposes. 
A. Epigenetic relationships between cryptography and 
gene expression. 
Epigenetics involves heritable control of gene 
expression that does not involve modifications of the 
underlying DNA sequence[l5]. Examples of epigenetic 
effects include: DNA methylation of cytosine residues[l6], 
and control of gene expression via the higher order 
structures of DNA. In eukaryotes, DNA is packed into a 
higher order nucleosome structure which is in turn packed 
into a higher order structure called chromatin[l 7). 
Chromatin states can also be utilized as a form of encryption 
and decryption by exposing or not exposing genes for 
transcription. Examples include: 
• Heterochromatin form (encrypted) and Euchromatin 
form ( decrypted) 
• Post-translational control of chromatin states[l 8) 
Histone Code[l9]. Histone lysine acetylation by 
histone acetyl transferase - open chromatin 
(decrypted); Histone lysine deacetylation by histone 
deacetylase - closed chromatin (encrypted). 
Expansion of the cryptographic protocols to include 
epigenetic operations will increase the richness of the 
protocols and the options for producing combinations of 
cipherproteins. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A cryptographic hash code based upon a DNA alphabet 
and a secure MANET authentication protocol has been 
presented. These codes can be utilized at the network level 
or application level and can also be implemented directly 
into genomes of choice to provide a new level of ciphertext 
communication at the genomic and proteomic level. The 
DNA inspired cryptographic coding approach is an option in 
developing true MANET architectures and developing novel 
forms of biological authentication to augment those 
architectures. 
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Figure 12. Conceptual example of Confidentiality and Authentication in E. coli using lacZ expression 
Genomics MAC 
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lacZ gene Is encrypted by 
presence of glucose and 
lack of CAP at the lacZ 
promoter binding site 
Absence of glucose and 
presence of CAP at/acZ 
promoter decrypts the lacZ 
gene.CAP and RNA 
polymerase MAC 
authenticate the binding 
sitesso that RNA 
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/ac:Zpromoter 
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Repressor protein to 
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to lacZ operator and 
encrypts /aczgene by 
binding to operator site 
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I Exon (protein coding region) 
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I Promoterproxlmal elements 
Figure 13. Simplified comparison between gene transcription control regions and MAC protocol 
